Research Diary n°2: Ukraine’s new strategy 2015-2016
A dive into the the strategy documents of Ukraine
This is the Research Diary, a series based on the author’s research efforts on Ukraine’s Defence reforms between 2014 and 2022 with the aim of completing a dissertation by spring 2024
Introduction
The annexation of Crimea, the war in the Donbas in 2014 and the failures of Ukraine’s defence forces to react to these aggressions prompted its government to enact a comprehensive review of its defence and security sectors. Between 2015 and 2016, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, decreed a series of strategic documents aimed at establishing Ukraine’s vision of its security and strategic environment as well as setting the priorities of the state concerning its defence and security sectors.
Strategic documents are an exercise in strategy. At its core, strategy is the adequation of objectives and the means to complete them. The objectives define the means used, but limited resources also limit which objectives can realistically be attained. Therefore, strategy is also about making choices and putting priorities in place.
Strategic documents are the result of this exercise. In our case, they aim to communicate the strategy established to the public, to the public servants and to the international audience.
For our research purposes, analysing Ukraine’s strategic documents enable us to have a better understanding of the actor, his perception of his environment, his objectives, his ambition, and the means he wants to utilise. They can also provide criteria for measuring how much the objectives have been achieved.
The relevant documents regarding the reform of the defence sector are the National Security Strategy (approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine on May 26, 2015, No. 287), the Military Doctrine of Ukraine (approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine of September 24, 2015 No. 555), the Concept of the Development of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine (approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine of March 14, 2016, No. 92) and, the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine (approved by order of the President of Ukraine No. 240 dated June 6, 2016 No.473)
The National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy is the first document published. This is a high-level, short document that is not only specific to defence or law enforcement issues but also the whole other fields of security such as economic, energy, cyber, information and environmental security. The document also sets foreign policy objectives.
It starts with an assessment of the security threats concerning Ukraine. The main threat identified is the Russian Federation due to its occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and its actions in supporting the Donbas separatists. The Russian Federation drives many of the security concerns of Ukraine in the economic, energy, cyber and information security. The second main threat that comes out from this document is corruption and inefficient public administration.
The document then identifies the main directions of state policy. The defence and foreign policy spheres take up the majority of this part. For Ukraine, the aim is to restore the territorial integrity of the country, reform (or rather create, as the document says) an effective defence and security apparatus, and drastically increase and improve the defence capabilities of the state. This includes a reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine but extends much larger than that. Reform is aimed at every level of the defence sector, the President of Ukraine, the defence Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs down to the individual soldier and ranges from the creation of an effective military-industrial complex to civil-military relations passing by training, procurement, creation of SOF, reforming the intelligence sector, adopting NATO/EU standards. It’s clear that the ambition of Ukraine is to completely restore its defence capabilities from the ground up.
Foreign policy is also an important part of the strategy. Ukraine wants to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic and European security and economic architecture at the sub-regional, regional, and global levels. Close cooperation with NATO and the EU and preparing for membership by adopting standards set by these institutions is a primary objective. Ukraine considers the United States as the main guarantor of international security, and developing a close strategic partnership is also a primary goal for Ukraine’s foreign policy. In addition, Ukraine wants closer cooperation with central and eastern European countries, support efforts in denuclearisation, reform of the UN security council and security mechanisms in the Black Sea.
The four pages left are dedicated to economic, informational, critical infrastructure and environmental security.
Overall, this document is quite broad and short, but it sets the perception of Ukraine’s security environment and the main actions of state policy for the long term. Russia and corruption and ineffective administration are seen as the main threats to security. The reform of the defence sector is the primary concern, with foreign policy following behind.
The Military Doctrine
The Military Doctrine defines the main goal of the Ukrainian military and defence policy for the short to medium term. This comprises all services and branches of the defence sectors, namely: the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service, other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine and special law enforcement agencies.
Like the National Security Strategy, it starts with an assessment of Ukraine’s security environment. The document analyses main world trends such as increased aggressiveness between centres of world power (the US and Russia are the only countries cited), instability in the Middle East (with ISIS at its peak at the time) and North Africa, the crisis of the international system established since 1945 and a shift to asymmetric use of military force. The document goes on to identify the regional threat, which is mainly centred around the Russian Federation’s action in Crimea, Donbas, their military modernisation, their destabilising foreign policy, and the informational war against Ukraine. It also dives deeper into the range of foreign political conditions, military threats and policy choices that might foster an escalation from the Russian Federation.
The threat scenarios to Ukraine’s military security are explicitly defined:
Full-scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation
Limited aggression with “hybrid” means (defined as a special operation by the doctrine) with the subsequent involvement of peacekeeping forces.
Blockades of seaports
Civil war with actors supported by the Russian Federation.
Conflict along Ukraine’s border
Terror attacks
The assessment finishes with the factors rendering Ukraine unable to completely assure its military security. This is especially interesting as it defines failures and challenges. The economic crisis is the first factor listed, with uncompleted reform efforts and lack of investment following closely behind. The rest of the factors are the consequences of the previous factors with poor readiness of all services, lack of coordination and low efficiency of the state’s institutions as well as insufficient efforts to counter information and psychological operations. A whole part is also dedicated to the military-industrial complex, which suffers from low effectiveness, lack of regulation, investment and innovation, inability to provide armaments and equipment, low profitability, low production rate… The list goes on.
This assessment of Ukraine’s security environment is more detailed than the one conducted in the National Security Strategy. It is also more focused, concentrating analysis on factors and scenarios regarding military threats. If the assessment does mention instability in the Middle East and increased uncertainty in the established international order, the threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine by the Russian Federation is the dominant concern.
This is reflected in the next parts of the Military Doctrine, which defines the goals and main tasks of defence policy. The main goals are the ability of Ukraine to
Repel the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (Crimea and Donbas)
Ensure the defence capability of Ukraine to deter or win an armed conflict
The document goes on to list all measures and goals for Ukrainian defence policy in the short to medium term. The list of objectives is extensive and covers all aspects of the defence sector. Some key takeaways in no particular order:
• Improvement of civilian control over the defence sector
• Adoption of NATO and EU standards in all branches, services, and the military-industrial complex
• Preservation and improvement of the partial mobilisation system
• Integration of volunteer/self-organised formations
• Active defence as the main use of Ukrainian military force
• Creation of a communication strategy in the information domain
• Possible use of military force to eliminate internal armed conflict
• The highest level of threat the Ukrainian defence sector should be ready for is full-scale armed aggression from the Russian Federation
The document then dives into the socio-economic conditions necessary for implementing the military policy. It starts by acknowledging a lack of funding, irrational use of resources, and lack of state support for the reform and development of the military-industrial complex.
For the defence policy to be put in place, drastic changes to the military-industrial changes need to be done, namely state planning of the needs of the defence sector and effective control over production, repair and modernisation of equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Better cooperation with the scientific sector, creation of a state material reserve, creation of training and education programs for labour, technical and engineering personnel, and improvement of the mechanisms of formation and control of expenditures. This is but of the few changes listed. Even more is detailed in the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine – 2020” (approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine dated January 12, 2015, No 5.)
These objectives can be seen as rather basic or straightforward. However, it shows that there is much to be reformed and built in regard to the military-industrial sector.
The following part is dedicated to the policies needed in the rest of the defence sector. Here again, the need for drastic reform is acknowledged. The first important points are about the improvement of legislation, planning, and clarifying functions, tasks and structure of the defence forces. The rest is about improving defence forces as a whole, such as their efficiency, coordination, training, combat potential, unified logistics systems, creation of SOF and more. One common guideline for almost all of these objectives is the adoption of NATO/ EU standards and best practices; Ukraine states that it wants to achieve total compatibility with NATO by 2020. The role of each institution is also defined along with the specific NATO principles and values that the defence forces need to follow.
Overall in the short- and medium-term, in parallel with ensuring the technical and operational compatibility of the defence forces with the armed forces of NATO member states, Ukraine plans to carry out the transformation and adaptation of documents on defence planning, operational and combat management, statutes and guidelines to NATO standards
To finance this need, Ukraine aims for at least 3% of GDP each year.
In short, this doctrine does dive deeper into the analysis of Ukraine’s environment and into its policy goals regarding the military and the defence sector. However, it does list an extensive number of goals, with few details on how to achieve them (in no particular order) other than “reform the entire defence sector”. This is often the risk with strategic papers that become wish lists rather than priority-making documents. Nonetheless, the document does set the broad tone and direction of the work to be done in this field, which, in the end, is its purpose.
The Concept of Development of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine
This Concept dives deeper into the objectives. It also starts with an assessment of the main objectives of the defence and military sectors. These are quite similar to what has been said on these issues in the National Security Strategy and the Military doctrine.
Where the document is more exhaustive than the previous two is regarding the set objectives. They are set per institution and by the short-term deadline (2017) and the medium-term one (2020). It also defines the role of each institution.
The institutions part of the defence sector, according to the document, are considered the following:
The list of objectives is extensive and difficult to summarise here. For example, here is the summary of objectives for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
By 2017, the AFU must:
• Optimisation and increase of combat capabilities of existing and formation of new military units
• Reforming the system of force management to ensure the management of inter-service cooperation and coordination
• The creation of the Special Operations Forces as a separate type of force
• Creation of new functional structures of the AFU (immediate forces response, build-up forces, reserve forces)
• Preparation of immediate response forces to cover the state border of Ukraine
• Preparation of reinforcement forces for strengthening standing forces in relation to repelling armed aggression
• Preparation of reserve forces for use by the decision of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a special period and/or during an anti-terrorist operation, as well as to provide assistance during natural disasters and man-made disasters
• Restoration of the military infrastructure
• Formation of a system of autonomous military bases on the basis of military towns with the necessary infrastructure for the location of military units, a fund for service housing and social and household facilities for servicemen and their family members
• Creation of an effective system of mobilisation and mobilisation training with the necessary number of military commissariats and the number of employees and with a single state register of conscripts
• Creation of appropriate conditions to ensure the gradual staffing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with servicemen under contract
• Achieving the ability of Ukrainian forces to respond adequately to threats of border armed conflict and maintaining the ability to increase operational capabilities in a special period to repel armed aggression against Ukraine
• Increasing the combat potential, restoring serviceability, extending the resource, carrying out modernisation, creating new systems and unifying samples of weapons and military equipment of AFU
• Formation of cyber security and cyber defence units of the AFU, implementation of interdepartmental coordination on these issues in the interests of ensuring the state’s defence capability
By 2020, the AFU must:
• Maintain and increase the combat capability of military units of constant readiness in accordance with NATO standards
• Transfer of the military management bodies of the AFU to the J-structure adopted as a basis in the headquarters of NATO member states, separation in the management system of functions related to the formation, training, and development of forces
• Further equipping the Armed Forces of Ukraine with modernised and new weapons and military equipment, considering needs and defined priorities
• Improvement of the information security system of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the AFU
• Improvement of the training system of forces, achievement of combat training indicators according to NATO standards
• Organisation of the development of modern samples of weapons and military equipment, means communication, informatisation and information protection
• Strengthening the capabilities and level of readiness of special operations forces, emergency forces response, reinforcement forces and reserve forces to perform assigned tasks
• Implementation of modern systems and technologies
Another important part of the document is the definition of the system of management, control, and interactions of the defence sector in times of peace and war. The role of the President of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council, the Joint Operational Headquarters, and the Main Situational Centre of Ukraine are explicated. Short- and medium-term objectives are also set concerning HR, logistic and combat support, infrastructure, education, information domain and the military-industrial complex.
To finance this strategy, the Concept of Development requires 5% of GDP spent per year, from which 3 % are dedicated to defence expenditures and 0.5% to the military-industrial complex.
Overall, this document is much more precise in terms of the objectives set per institution and their deadlines. It also starts to define the role of these institutions in peace and wartime. However, there is no effort of prioritisation between all the objectives cited.
Strategic Defence Bulletin
The Strategic Defence Bulletin is an especially important document as it is the final document in the strategy-making exercise that Ukraine launched. It is fed by all three previous documents and has the role of defining the role of the institution and setting priorities for the state.
The definition of roles is especially important to understand how Ukraine wants to structure their institutions.
The Verkhovna Rada (parliament) has the power to declare a state of war and peace and is the legislating body. The President of Ukraine is the Supreme Commander in Chief, and the Cabinet of Ministers ensure the implementation of policy and must lead the public-private partnership of the military-industrial complex.
The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine controls and reports on the activities of executive authorities in the defence and security sectors.
The Minister of Defence, subordinated to the President and accountable to the Verkhovna Rada, will be the central executive body of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and ensure civilian control over it with a civilian defence minister (by 2018). The Ministry of Defence is in charge of defence policy, planning, and programs and controls defence resources.
The document plan to separate the positions of “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” and “Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” by 2020. The Chief of General Staff is subordinate to the Commander in Chief and only handles tasks assigned to the General Staff, while the Commander in Chief handles the Armed Forces as a whole and reports to the President. The General Staff should be the main institution in charge of defence and strategic planning. The document also specifies that there is a duplication of roles and resources between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence and that they should be clearly divided by 2018. Subsequent to the Commander in Chief are also the Commanders of the separate branches/services and the Commander of the Joint force who will act within the Joint Operational Headquarters.
Overall, this is a structure close to what NATO countries have, and Ukraine aims to replicate it.
Next is the implementation mechanisms of the defence reform, such as the necessary legal changes and the positive and negative factors that might influence this process. Some notable legal change is the need to clarify the main functions and tasks of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which suffers from overlap and duplication of efforts.
Notable positive factors are the support and deep cooperation with NATO, the EU and the US. Negative factors are the risk of duplication, obsolete legal frameworks and ineffective conceptual approaches in the field of defence planning.
The bulletin then specifies the prioritisation efforts. There are five strategic goals under which each has a series of operational goals. All ranked from highest to lowest priority:
FIRST – joint command of defence forces conducted in compliance with principles and standards accepted by the NATO states
Democratic/civilian control of defence forces
Improvement of the defence management system
Improvement of military leadership by separating trainers and combat leaders
Creation of an effective C4ISR system
Improvement in cyber and information protection
Increase the efficiency of anti-corruption institutions
Create a field of strategic communication to dominate the information space
SECOND – efficient politics, systems of planning and resources management in the defence sector using advanced Euro-Atlantic approaches
Adoption of the NATO defence planning process
Creation of an integrated risk management system
Implement a planning cell for the development of capabilities of the defence forces
Implementation of Euro-Atlantic practices of defence budget planning
Creation of an integrated procurement system in the Ministry of Defence
Improvement in the mechanisms of creation and implementation of the state defence order (request to the military-industrial complex)
Implementation of the infrastructure management system
Removing functions of the Ministry of Defence that are not initially privy to it
THIRD – operational (combat, special) capabilities of the defence forces necessary for the guaranteed defeat of armed aggression, defence of the country, maintaining peace and international security
Improvement of doctrinal documents on training according to NATO standards to achieve compatibility
Optimisation of the organisational structures and compositions of the AFU in peacetime
Standardisation of weapons, equipment modernisation and purchase of new equipment
Creation of Special Operations Forces according to NATO standards
Creation of an effective military intelligence system according to NATO standards
Revival of Ukraine’s naval potential
Reforming Military Law
FOURTH – joint logistics system and medical support system which can provide support for all the components of the defence forces
Improvement, unification and standardisation of the logistical support system
Creation of a medical support system
FIFTH – professional development of the defence forces and creation of a military reserve.
Development of social support for personnel
Improvement of the system of military education and personnel training
Reforming the mobilisation system and creating a military reserve
Creation of a modern HR management system
This document provides clear objectives for the future of Ukraine’s defence sector by defining how the political and military institutions should be structured. It also sets clear priorities for the reform efforts.
Implication for research and concluding thoughts
Strategic documents tend to become more of a whilst than actual strategies. Ukraine certainly had huge ambitions for its reform efforts that touched every level and branch of the defence sector. These four documents, however, are supposed to complete each other, and if the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine operate are quite a high level, they do define the general direction the country wants to go to and do a deep assessment of Ukraine’s strategic environment, while the Concept of Development and the Strategic Defence Bulletin set more detailed objectives with timelines and priorities.
Overall, reading and summarising these documents provided a good understanding of Ukraine’s perception of its security environment, goals, means, timelines, and priorities, which was the goal. I’ll mention The Strategic Defence Bulletin, which has been the most helpful in understanding how Ukraine wanted to structure their defence management systems which will be important in order to compare the ground realities.
Translated Documents:
Well done, Sir. You are blazing a pair of very interesting trails, one with the research you are doing and another with the way you are keeping the rest of us apprised of your progress.